The British force was led by Lord Chelmsford, who anticipated an easy victory and national fame. He commanded some 4,700 highly-trained soldiers assisted by colonial volunteers, all equipped with the latest Martini-Henry rifles, all supported by field guns of the Royal Artillery.

Facing them on the vast baking hot plain at Isandlwana was the Zulu army of 35,000 spear wielding warriors, a few armed with an assortment of ancient and inaccurate muzzle-loading firearms acquired from unscrupulous traders.

When the Zulus first appeared in the distance, some 15 miles away, Chelmsford broke the first military rule in enemy territory. He divided his force to meet the Zulus, leaving over 1,500 behind in the main camp beneath Isandlwana hill.

It was this reserve force that the Zulus attacked, leaving Chelmsford’s force stranded miles away and unable to help.

‘Battle of Isandhlwana’ by Charles Edwin Fripp, 1885 (Credit: National Army Museum, South Africa).

As Chelmsford later remarked on viewing the body-strewn and shattered camp, “but I left a strong force here” – how was this possible?

Training and induction

By 1878, the part-time Zulu army was neither professional nor well trained.

Young Zulu warrior photographed in 1860 (Credit: Anthony Preston).

The only military training Zulu warriors received took place during their initial induction into their age-set regiment, a form of national service.

In all matters they relied on instructions from their indunas (officers) who, in turn, demanded absolute obedience from their warriors.

British intelligence led Chelmsford to believe that the total strength of the Zulu army amounted to between 40,000 and 50,000 men immediately available for action.

The total Zulu population in 1878 only amounted to some 350,000 people, so this figure is probably correct.

Army corps and regiments

‘Zulu Warriors’ by Charles Edwin Fripp, 1879 (Credit: Public domain).

The Zulu army was soundly structured and consisted of 12 such corps. These corps necessarily contained men of all ages, some being married, others unmarried, some being old men scarcely able to walk and others of boys.

By the time of the Zulu War, the total number of regiments in the Zulu army amounted to 34, of whom 18 were married and 16 unmarried.

7 of the former were composed of men over 60 years of age, so that for practical purposes there were only 27 Zulu regiments fit to take the field amounting to some 44,000 warriors.

Discipline and transport

Tactical drill was unknown to the Zulu army, although they could perform a number of essential movements based on large animal hunts with speed and accuracy.

Their skirmishing skills were extremely good, and warriors perform under heavy fire with the utmost determination.

Unlike the lumbering British invasion force, the Zulu army required but little commissariat or transport. Three or 4 days’ provisions consisting of maize or millet and a herd of beef cattle accompanied each regiment.

British Army’s military map of Zulu Land, 1879 (Credit: Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster General’s Department of the British Army).

The company officers marched immediately in rear of their men, the second-in-command in rear of the left wing, and the commanding officer in rear of the right.

This tried and tested plan was now put into operation to defend Zululand from the British invasion force invading at three points along the Zululand border.

Pre-war ceremonies

Chelmsford’s planned invasion occured just as the Zulu regiments were assembling from across Zululand at Ulundi for the annual “first fruits” ceremonies.

On arriving at the king’s royal homestead, important pre-war ceremonies took place and various medicines and drugs were administered to the warriors to enhance their fighting capacity and to encourage their belief that these “powders” (cannabis and other narcotics) would render them immune from British firepower.

On the third day, the warriors were sprinkled with magical muti and commenced their march of some 70 miles towards the British border with Natal.

Battle tactics and spies

Lieutenants Melvill and Coghill flee the camp with the Queen’s Colour of the 1st battalion of the 24th Regiment (Credit: Stanford).

The battle tactic for engaging the British was proven, efficient, simple and understood by every Zulu warrior.

Military operations were controlled by senior Zulus, usually from a remote vantage point, although one of their number could be dispatched into the battle to rally or lead if an assault faltered, as happened at Isandlwana.

The Zulus made great use of spies; they had an elaborate system for obtaining and transmitting intelligence and were efficient at outpost duty. They already knew exactly where the British were and Zulu spies reported their every move back to the Zulu generals.

“The horns of the bull”

The actual Zulu battle formation resembled a crescent shape with two flanks moving to encircle the enemy.

The formation was  known by Europeans as the “horns of the bull”, and had been developed over hundreds of years when hunting large herds of game.

Lord Chelmsford, c. 1870 (Credit: Public domain).

The fast-moving encircling horns consisted of the younger fitter warriors, with the body or chest made up of the more seasoned warriors who would bear the brunt of a frontal attack.

The tactic was most successful when the two horns completed the encirclement of the enemy and relied, in part, on the main body of warriors remaining out of sight until the horns met. They would then rise up and close in to slaughter the victims.

A large body of troops were also kept in reserve; they were usually held, sitting with their backs to the enemy. The commanders and staff would assemble on high ground between the battle and their reserves, all orders being delivered by runners.

Each man usually carried 4 or 5 throwing spears. One short and heavy bladed spear was used solely for stabbing and was never parted with; the others were lighter, and sometimes thrown.

On the battlefield

‘Lts Melvill and Coghill attacked by Zulu warriors’ by Charles Edwin Fripp (Credit: Project Guttenberg).

At Isandlwana, Zulu commanders were successfully able to control an extended advance across a 5 to 6-mile front to the extent that they completely encircled not only the British position but also the hill of Isandlwana itself.

Popular myth records the Zulus moving into attack the British position at Isandlwana in mass formation. However, the reality was an attack in open skirmishing lines up to a quarter mile deep. Certainly, from a distance, such a large force carrying shields would have appeared very densely packed.

The Zulus advanced at a steady jogging speed and completed the final attack at a run, quickly overwhelming the British line. Once amongst their enemy, the short stabbing spear or assegai was most effective.

The tactic succeeded brilliantly at Isandlwana. The battle raged for less than an hour, Chelmsford’s force of some 1,600 men were slaughtered; less than 100 managed to escape, probably before the Zulus attacked.

After the Zulu success at Isandlwana, Natal was utterly helpless to defend itself, the British invasion force was part-defeated and part-surrounded yet King Cetshwayo failed to capitalise on his victory.

Dr Adrian Greaves has lived in Zululand and has examined Zulu history over a period of some 30 years. The Tribe That Washed its Spears is his latest book on the subject, co-written with his Zulu friend Xolani Mkhize, and is published by Pen & Sword.

The Tribe That Washed Its Spears

They were wrong.

Enemy sightings

Not long after Chelmsford departed, Pulleine deployed videttes (mounted scouts) on high vantage points surrounding the camp. They soon discovered some disturbing movements.

Just before 8.00 am, 19 year old trooper Walywyn Barker spotted a significant Zulu force advancing from the east. Quickly the report was relayed back to the camp, where other videttes reported similar sightings. They claimed the enemy host numbered in the thousands.

The message was soon relayed to Colonel Pulleine, who hastily sent a courier to Chelmsford:

Zulus are advancing in force from the left front of the camp.

Though Pulleine still expected this to be enough for Chelmsford to return to the camp with force, the message lacked detail – something which ultimately proved decisive. It convinced Chelmsford that the camp was not in any serious danger.

Frederic Augustus Thesiger, 2nd Baron Chelmsford.

Making ready…sort of

Pulleine remained reassured that the Zulus would not attack the camp, but he nevertheless ordered his men to make ready. In total, the Colonel had 1,241 troops at his disposal, a mix of European and African troops.

Later that morning, a more alarming report reached the camp. Trooper Arthur Adams reported seeing an enemy army numbering 25-30,000 men in the vicinity.

Despite the growing warnings, Pulleine still refused to believe the enemy force intended to launch an attack on the camp. Just as Chelmsford had before him, he refused to erect any defensive fortifications, such as creating a defensive laager.

The arrival of Durnford

Colonel Anthony William Durnford. He was a veteran of the preceding Xhosa Wars, during which he had suffered an injury that paralysed his left arm.

Relief arrived at the camp at just past 10am. Colonel Durnford, an Irish career British Army officer, had arrived with 526 mounted reinforcements, including his famous Natal Native Zikhali Horse. Upon his arrival Durnford swiftly took command of the force and took action.

He had a portion of his Zikhali Horse sent up to reconnoitre the Nqutu Plateau to the north of the camp, commanded by William Barton.

As for Durnford himself, he would lead another segment of his soldiers east, to pursue some ‘retreating’ Zulus that he believed were heading for Chelmsford’s army. By this time it was around 11.30 am.

Discovered

Having reached the Plateau, Barton and his men rode east towards the Ngwebeni Valley. It was then that Lieutenant Charles Raw spotted a small herd of cattle near the ridge of the Valley and attempted to capture the livestock.

It was then, as they crossed the ridge of the hill, that they were met with a terrifying spectacle.

Thousands of Zulus had stationed themselves within the Valley, waiting patiently. Raw and his men had stumbled upon the enemy.

Quickly Raw lined up his mounted riflemen to release a volley on the Zulus. The Zulus responded, standing up and charging their foe. Raw soon re-joined with Barton and together they commenced a fighting retreat towards the camp, along the Plateau.

The Zulus had started their attack, with one of their first targets being Durnford’s ill-fated rocket battery. When they heard the gunfire from Raw’s soldiers, this small unit had stationed themselves far to the east of the camp, completely exposed. They managed to launch one rocket on their enemy, before they were swiftly overwhelmed.

Meanwhile, back at the camp the soldiers were still not expecting to fight. That was however, until they heard the sounds of gunfire. The grave news reached them soon after as messengers from Barton’s squadron confirmed the worst: they had found the main Zulu army. And it was coming their way.

Zulu warriors carrying their iconic ox-hide shields and firearms.

Battle stations

Pulleine was now faced with the battle no-one saw coming. Hastily he sent a further letter to Chelmsford, informing him of the situation, before sending out his infantry companies to form a defensive line on a wide perimeter to the east of the camp.

The British left flank was situated at the top of the Tahelane Ridge on the Nqutu Plateau, commanded by George Shepstone. It was not long before they were confronted by the opposing right wing of the Zulu formation: the right horn. This horn was intending to outflank and encircle the camp.

Shepstone’s force resisted for a time, but it was not long before they were ordered to abandon the ridge and form up the left flank’s defence closer to the camp. There, they were to hold back the Zulu right horn for a considerable length of time.

Meanwhile in the centre, things were going better for Durnford and Pulleine’s force. The 2 pounder cannons at their disposal were wrecking havoc on the Zulu chest, the central thrust of their formation. Combined with the rifle fire, the Zulu centre suffered heavily.

Further to the right, Durnford’s men (who by then had dismounted and entrenched themselves in a dry gully on the right side of the defence) were similarly holding back the Zulu ‘left horn’ opposing them. The defence was holding.

This defence could not last indefinitely however. As the fighting continued, the ammunition of the defenders began to run low. Soldiers started to use up their standard 70 bullets and urgent requests for resupplies became widespread throughout the front line.

1879 sketch of the Battle of Isandlwana. The Ngwebeni Valley is situated to the north-east.

The ammunition supply

This proved a problem. Pulleine’s decision to go to Durnford’s aid and form up the British defensive line on a wide perimeter, far from the camp, meant ammo resupplies took time to arrive; the heavy ammo boxes were also sealed by screw-tightened lids that proved difficult to remove. Furthermore, some of the quartermasters infamously refused to distribute ammo to soldiers who were not from their regiments.

The result was disaster.  As soon as his men had exhausted their ammo supplies, Durnford sounded the retreat. Instantly, the Zulus pounced and started to outflank.

In the centre, as the barrage began to subside, Zulu warriors leapt up and inspired their comrades to resume the assault. They attacked with renewed vigour. In the face of this revived charge, Pulleine’s company soldiers and the Natal Native Contingents supporting them attempted to retreat before they were cut down:

Our ammunition failed once but we got more from the camp, and remained firing until the Zulus were within 100 yards of us…The company of soldiers was with us and on nearing the tents knelt down and commenced firing on the enemy…Our captain now got off his horse and gave it to me, telling me to take it to the ammunition wagons and, turning back…he joined the red soldiers who were firing and I never saw him again.

Malindi, an NNC auxiliary

The defence became fragmented; the Zulus were among them; the line had broken.

Anarchy

Having broken through the defence the Zulus entered the camp, having been ordered to show any redcoats they encountered no mercy. A Zulu warrior recalled what happened when one band attempted to surrender:

How can we give you mercy when you have come to us to take away our country and eat us up? uSuthu!

It was around this time, as the Zulus started wrecking havoc among the tents, that it is believed Colonel Pulleine was killed.

For a short time, behind the camp Colonel Durnford and some of his Natal volunteers kept a narrow ‘escape route’ open for retreating soldiers. Soon however, Durnford’s force was overwhelmed, the man himself was killed and the two Zulu horns completed their manoeuvre, encircling the camp. For those still in the camp, their fate was sealed.

‘The last stand at Isandlwana’ by Charles Edwin Fripp. Today you can view the painting in the National Army Museum.

The survivors fled to the Buffalo River, chased all the way by the Zulus. The bank became the scenes of some of the most terrible fighting.

Amidst the chaos a story arose that Lieutenants Coghill and Melville had attempted to save the Regimental Colour, but were cut down during the escape. This version of events, however, is now hotly-contested. Some witnesses claimed the two officers had fled out of cowardice, using the Colour as an excuse to flee.

The aftermath

This is a photo of Isandlwana the hill in Kwazulu Natal, South Africa where the Battle of Isandlwana was fought. The rockpile in foreground is one of many marking the location of British mass graves at the site.

Only 55 Europeans and 350 Africans survived the disaster on the British side, out of a total of 1,762 (soldiers and camp followers).

Casualties were significant on both sides and to this day, memorials to the fallen warriors remain well-preserved at the base of Isandlwana Hill.

Memorial erected at the site commemorating the valour of the fallen Zulu impi at Isandlwana Hill, which is visible in the background.

It was a truly terrible battle. In accordance with tribal ritual, the Zulus disembowelled their fallen enemies, much to the horror of Chelmsford’s Column when they later reached the battlefield.

The General was stunned. Worse was to follow. Fires were seen in the distance, coming from Rorke’s Drift. It was just the beginning.

Referenced

David, Saul 2004 Zulu Viking Penguin Random House

Frederic Augustus Thesiger, 2nd Baron Chelmsford.

Opening moves

Chelmsford himself joined the Column on 12 January and took effective control. That same day his men met with some initial success, when they overwhelmed the small warbands of a local Zulu chieftain.

Despite being outnumbered these Zulus had chosen to resist the invaders. It was a symbol of things to come.

Chelmsford’s plan centred around caution. Slowly, his army would drive the Zulus back, away from the Natal border and towards oNdini (Ulundi), the capital of the Zulu king Cetshwayo. It would be there that he believed the decisive clash would take place.

Chelmsford was confident in the plan and the invasion; he was convinced that the Zulus would avoid fighting a pitched battle against his technologically-superior force, until forced into one by his own aggressive movements.

Isandlwana

Logistical problems and repetitive, small skirmishes proved a nuisance for Chelmsford during the opening days of the invasion. By 16 January his progress from the Buffalo River had culminated at a peculiar-shaped hill 11 miles from the border. It was called Isandlwana.

A photo of Isandlwana Hill, taken in 1882.

Isandlwana Hill was sphinx-like in its appearance, leading the British troops of the 24^th Regiment to believe this was an auspicious sign – the Sphinx was the official emblem of the Regiment. It was here, near the hill’s steep slopes, that Chelmsford decided to make a new camp.

The uneven terrain surrounding the camp caused some immediate concerns among Chelmsford’s adjutants. Furthermore, believing that the Zulus would avoid aggressive action the general had decided against either entrenching the camp or erecting a defensive laager (wagon fort). This was against standard procedure.

Several subordinates questioned these key decisions regarding the camp, but Chelmsford dismissed them. The historian Saul David notes,

Chelmsford did not take the necessary precautions because he did not think he needed to.

Saul David, Zulu (2004)

The Zulus respond

The British advance forced Cetshwayo to respond with force. On 17 January he gathered the main Zulu army at kwaNodwengu and readied them for battle. Zulu military tactics revolved around the fighting of short campaigns with decisive pitched battles. They favoured aggression.

Before his troops departed, Cetshwayo supposedly advised them how best to counter their foe:

If you come near to the white man and find that he has made trenches and built forts that are full of holes, do not attack him for it will be of no use. But if you see him out in the open you can attack him because you will be able to eat him up.

His words proved prophetic.

Zulu military tactics centred around short, aggressive and decisive campaigns, so that the militia could return to their homes in time to tend the harvest.

The beginning

In the early morning of 21 January Lord Chelmsford had decided to dispatch a patrol force from Isandlwana, consisting of natives, Natal Military Police and mounted volunteers. Their task was to reconnoitre a rough track that led up to the Mangeni Falls, southeast of Isandlwana.

A map of Zululand and neighbouring Natal. Isandlwana is visible just left of centre.

In command of the patrol was Major John Dartnell, a man who was very popular with the soldiers.

Dartnell lead the expedition out of the camp and it wasn’t long before they encountered enemy activity. As they approached the Mangeni River, Dartnell spotted a sizeable Zulu force. Believing that he was not yet strong enough to counter the enemy force Dartnell decided that his patrol would keep a close eye on it throughout the night.

He sent a message to Chelmsford, informing him of the situation and his plan. Chelmsford received the message in early evening, replying that Dartnell should choose to engage the enemy, ‘if and when he thought fit’.

Dartnell calls for aid

By the time that messenger reached Dartnell with the response, however, circumstances had changed. Dramatically so. By then the Zulu force Dartnell was monitoring had significantly increased, numbering some several thousand.

Hastily Dartnell had dispatched another courier to inform Chelmsford of the increase in activity, as well as a request for supplies. Chelmsford refused the former request, but did approve the latter, sending inadequate rations for Dartnell’s force.

Zulu warriors carrying their iconic ox-hide shields and firearms.

Zulu activity only continued to increase into the night; through the darkness, Dartnell’s patrol spotted more and more enemy fires to the east. The commander’s concerns continued to grow. No longer could he conceivably think about attacking his enemy the next morning – such an act would be suicidal without reinforcements.

Without delay, in the late evening of 21 January 1879, Dartnell sent a third messenger back to Isandlwana requesting Chelmsford march to his patrol’s aid, particularly with his British infantry regulars.

The message reached the camp at c.1.30am on 22 January. Within the half-hour Chelmsford was awake and had ordered his men to make ready to march at daybreak.

Defend the camp

View of Isandlwana Hill and the Battlefield. Image Credit: Michael Gundelfinger / Commons.

Chelmsford would take most of the main Column with him. To guard Isandlwana, he would leave:

• 5 companies of the 1^st Battalion of the 24^th Regiment
• 1 company of 2/24^th
• 3 companies of the 3^rd Natal Native Contingent
• 2 artillery guns
• 1 squadron of mounted troops and some Natal Native Pioneers.

In total this numbered 1,241 soldiers: 891 Europeans and 350 Africans.

To reinforce the Isandlwana camp defence, Chelmsford sent an order to Colonel Anthony Durnford, currently stationed at Rorke’s Drift, to march his contingent (526 men) to the camp and reinforce.

He left Colonel Henry Pulleine in charge with orders to hold the camp, though no-one expected it to be the site of a major battle:

Nobody from the General downwards had the least suspicion that there was a chance of the enemy attacking the camp.

Staff Officer Francis Clery

For all Chelmsford and his officers knew, it appeared Dartnell had discovered the main Zulu army. This was who Chelmsford intended to march out and confront. In fact it was quite the opposite.

Colonel Anthony William Durnford.

A distraction

The Zulu impi that had caused Dartnell so much concern was only a distraction, a detachment sent from the main Zulu army to lure the bulk of the British Column away from Isandlwana:

They kept fires burning all night to convince Dartnell that the main Zulu Army was near

Saul David, Zulu (2004)

It worked.

At dawn on 22 January, Chelmsford led the majority of his Column out of the camp towards Dartnell’s position. Little did he know that his actions were playing directly into his enemy’s hands.

Chelmsford and his force reached Dartnell’s position at 6.30am. Over the next few hours they pursued dispersing bands of Zulus further and further away from Pulleine and the garrison at Isandlwana. Throughout the day various reports reached them from the camp, hints that it was under attack.

Nevertheless Chelmsford remained convinced no serious danger threatened Isandlwana. By 2pm, still he remained unaware of the danger to his rear. For the British, it was a fatal mistake, for the Zulus, a triumph in tactical planning.

Referenced

David, Saul 2004 Zulu Viking Penguin Random House

Yet things soon went terribly wrong. On 22 January 1879 a British force stationed next to a hill called Isandlwana found themselves opposed by some 20,000 Zulu warriors, well-versed in the art of war and under orders to show no mercy. What followed was a bloodbath.

Here are 12 facts about the Battle of Isandlwana.

1. Lord Chelmsford invaded Zululand with a British army on 11 January

Lord Chelmsford.

The invasion came after Cetshwayo, the king of the Zulu Kingdom, did not reply to an unacceptable British ultimatum that demanded (among other things) he disband his 35,000-strong army.

Chelmsford thus led a 12,000-strong army – divided into three columns – into Zululand, despite having received no authorisation from Parliament. It was a land grab.

2. Chelmsford made a fundamental tactical error

Confident that his modernised army could easily quash Cetshwayo’s technologically inferior forces, Chelmsford was more worried that the Zulus would avoid fighting him on the open field.

He therefore divided his central column (that consisted of over 4,000 men) in two, leading the majority of his army towards where he believed he would find the main Zulu army: at Ulundi.

3. 1,300 men were left to defend Isandlwana…

Half of this number were either native auxiliaries or European colonial troops; the other half were from British battalions. Chelmsford placed these men under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine.

4. …but the camp was not suited for defence

Isandlwana Hill today, with a white cairn in the foreground highlighting a British mass grave.

Chelmsford and his staff decided not to erect any substantial defences for Isandlwana, not even a defensive circle of wagons.

5. The Zulus then sprung their trap

At around 11am on 22 January a British Native Horse contingent discovered some 20,000 Zulus hidden in a valley within seven miles of the lightly-defended British camp. The Zulus had completely outmanoeuvred their foe.

Zulu warriors. They were organised into regiments called ‘Impis’.

6. The Zulus were discovered by Zikhali’s Native Horse contingent

Their discovery prevented the camp from being taken by complete surprise.

7. The British battalions resisted for over an hour…

Despite the limited defences, the British soldiers – equipped with the powerful Martini-Henry rifle – stood their ground, firing volley after volley of bullets into the approaching Zulus until their ammunition ran low.

8. …but the Zulus ultimately overwhelmed the British camp

Only a part of the Zulu army was attacking the British camp head on. At the same time, another Zulu force was outflanking the British right wing – part of their famous buffalo horns formation, designed to encircle and pin the enemy.

After this separate Zulu force had successfully outmanoeuvred the British, Pulleine and his men found themselves attacked on multiple sides. Casualties began to mount rapidly.

9. It was one of the worst defeat ever suffered by a modern army against a technologically inferior indigenous force

By the end of the day, hundreds of British redcoats lay dead on the slope of Isandlwana – Cetshwayo having ordered his warriors to show them no mercy. The Zulu attackers also suffered – they lost somewhere between 1,000 and 2,500 men.

Today memorials commemorating the fallen on both sides are visible at the site of the battlefield, beneath Isandlwana Hill.

10. The story goes that an attempt was made to save the Colour…

The story goes that two Lieutenants – Nevill Coghill and Teignmouth Melville – attempted to save the Queen’s Colour of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment. As they were trying to cross the Buffalo River, however, Coghill lost the Colour in the current. It would be discovered ten days later further downstream and now hangs in Brecon Cathedral.

As for Coghill and Melville, according to the story battered and bruised they reached the far bank of the Buffalo River where they made their final stand. Both were posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross for their actions and their heroic tale reached mythic proportions back home, resulting in it being relayed in various paintings and artwork.

A painting of Coghill and Melville attempting to save the Queen’s Colour of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment. The painting was done by French artist Alphonse de Neuville in 1880 – one year after the battle.

11…but not everyone viewed Coghill and Melville as heroes

In his South African journal, British commander Garnet Wolseley stated,

“I don’t like the idea of officers escaping on horseback when their men on foot are being killed.”

Some witnesses claim that Coghill and Melville fled Isandlwana out of cowardice, not to save the colours.

12. Contemporary British Imperialist poetry described the disaster as the British Thermopylae

Paintings, poetry and newspaper reports all emphasised the valiant British soldier fighting to the end in their desire to show Imperial heroism at the battle (the 19th century was a time when Imperialist thinking was very visible within British society).

Albert Bencke’s poem, for example, highlighted the deaths of the soldiers stating,

‘Death they could not but foreknow

Yet to save their country’s honour

Died, their faces to the foe.

Yea so long a time may be

Purest glory shall illumine

“Twenty-fourth’s” Thermopylae!’

The official portrayal of this defeat in Britain thus attempted to glorify the disaster with tales of heroism and valour.

Albert Bencke attempted to compare the British last stand at Isandlwana to the Spartan last stand at Thermopylae.

The successful defence against all odds has caused many to regard this battle as one of the greatest in British history, despite its relative insignificance in the outcome of the Anglo-Zulu War.

Here are twelve facts about the battle.

1. It followed the disastrous British defeat at Isandlwana

A contemporary painting of the Battle of Isandlwana.

It was the worst defeat ever suffered by a modern army against a technologically inferior indigenous force. Following their victory, a reserve of the Zulu ‘impi’  marched towards Rorke’s Drift, keen to destroy the small British garrison stationed there, on the border of the Kingdom of Zululand.

2. The Rorke’s Drift garrison consisted of 150 men

Almost all of these men were British regulars of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment of Foot (2nd/24th) under Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead.

3. They were facing over 3,000 Zulu warriors

These men were fierce warriors, well-versed in the art of war and under orders to show no mercy.  One of their primary weapon was a light spear called an iklwa (or assegai), that could either be thrown or used in hand-to-hand combat. Many also used a club called an iwisa (or knockberrie). All warriors carried an oval shield made of oxhide.

A few Zulus equipped themselves with firearms (muskets), but most preferred their traditional equipment. Others were equipped with powerful Martini-Henry rifles – taken from the dead British soldiers at Isandlwana.

Zulu warriors carrying their iconic ox-hide shields and firearms.

4. John Chard commanded the defence

Chard was a Lieutenant in the Royal Engineers. He had been dispatched from the Isandlwana column to build a bridge over the Buffalo River. Upon hearing that a large Zulu army was approaching, he took command of the Rorke’s Drift garrison, supported by Bromhead and Assistant Commissary James Dalton.

Initially, Chard and Bromhead considered abandoning the Drift and retreating to Natal. Dalton however, convinced them to remain and fight.

John Rouse Merriott Chard.

5. Chard and his men transformed Rorke’s Drift into a bastion

Aided by Commissary Dalton and Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead, the former garrison commander, Chard soon transformed Rorke’s Drift into a defend-able position. He ordered the men to erect a wall of mealie bags around the Mission Station and to fortify the buildings with loopholes and barricades.

A contemporary drawing of the Rorke’s Drift defence.

6. The battle soon descended into fierce hand-to-hand fighting

It was a fight of assegai vs bayonet as the Zulus tried to break through the defences.

The Defence of Rorke’s Drift by Lady Elizabeth Butler. Chard and Bromhead are pictured in the centre, directing the defence.

7. There was a fierce fight for the hospital

As the fight raged on, Chard realised that he needed to shorten the perimeter of the defence and thus had to give up control of the hospital. The men defending the hospital began a fighting retreat through the building – some of whom carried patients too injured to move.

Although most of the men successfully escaped the building, some were killed during the evacuation.

A recreation of the British evacuation of the hospital. The defenders cut open the walls dividing the rooms to escape. Credit: RedNovember 82 / Commons.

8. Zulu attacks continued deep into the night

Zulu attacks on the Drift continued until around 4am in the morning of 23 January 1879. By daybreak however, a sleep-depraved British force discovered that the Zulu force had disappeared.

The arrival of a British relief column commanded by Lord Chelmsford later that day put the end of the battle beyond doubt, much to the relief of the paranoid Drift defenders.

A depiction of Prince Dabulamanzi, the Zulu Commander at the Battle of Rorke’s Drift, from the Illustrated London News

9. The British force lost 17 men

These were mostly inflicted by assegai-wielding Zulu warriors. Only five British casualties came from Zulu firearms. 15 British soldiers were wounded during the fight.

351 Zulus, meanwhile, were killed during the battle while another 500-odd were wounded. It is possible that the British put to death all the injured Zulus.

The British survivors of the battle of Rorke’s Drift, 23 January 1879.

10. The battle was turned into one of the most famous war movies in history

In 1964 ‘Zulu’ came to world cinemas and became, arguably, one of the greatest British war films of all time. The film stars Stanley Baker as Lieutenant John Chard and a young Michael Caine as Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead.

Michael Caine playing Gonville Bromhead in the 1964 film Zulu.

11. Eleven Victoria Crosses were awarded after the Defence

It remains the most Victoria Crosses that have ever been awarded in one action. The recipients were:

• Lieutenant John Rouse Merriott Chard, 5th Field Coy, Royal Engineers
• Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
• Corporal William Wilson Allen; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
• Private Frederick Hitch; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
• Private Alfred Henry Hook; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
• Private Robert Jones; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
• Private William Jones; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
• Private John Williams; B Coy, 2nd/24th Foot
• Surgeon-Major James Henry Reynolds; Army Medical Department
• Acting Assistant Commissary James Langley Dalton; Commissariat and Transport Department
• Corporal Christian Ferdinand Schiess; 2nd/3rd Natal Native Contingent

An image showing John Chard receiving his Victoria Cross.

12. Many of the defenders suffered what we now know as PTSD following the battle

It was predominantly caused by the fierce close-combat fighting they had with the Zulus. Private Robert Jones, for instance, was said to have been plagued by recurring nightmares of his desperate hand-to-hand fights with the Zulus.

The headstone of Robert Jones V.C at Peterchurch cemetery. Credit: Simon Vaughan Winter / Commons.

The Buffalo frontier

Rorke’s Drift, a former trading post owned by Irish merchant James Rorke, assumed great strategic importance on 9 January 1879. With war between the Zulu Empire and the South African British colony of Natal threatening, the post was occupied by a British force due to its useful location right on the Buffalo river, which constituted the border between the two belligerents.

Just two days later, after a British ultimatum towards the Zulus expired without satisfactory answer, the troops in Rorke’s Drift – commanded by Lord Chelmsford – crossed the river and began to move into Zulu territory.

A very small garrison under a Lieutenant Bromhead of the Warwickshire Foot was left behind, with orders to turn the Drift into a makeshift hospital and supply post while his fellow soldiers marched north.

The Zulu Empire were a military force to be reckoned with. Over the course of the 19th century their battle tactics and weaponry – such as the famous Assegai spear – were enough to subjugate many of the surrounding African nations through conquest.

Only in the 1870s did they come into contact with the expanding British Empire, and despite a technological inferiority they had the numbers and experience to cause the British real problems in the right circumstances. And at the battle of Isandlwana, their status as formidable opponents was proved.

Disaster at Isandlwana

A Zulu force of 20,000, armed mainly with spears and shields, fell upon Chelmsford’s 1800-strong column and utterly defeated it, despite state-of-the-art rifles and heavy guns. Hundreds of British soldiers were killed in what was the Empire’s worst ever defeat to an indigenous foe.

On 22 January two exhausted riders reached Rorke’s Drift bearing this terrible news, and that 3-4,000 Zulu warriors were heading their way.

The garrison’s commanders – Lieutenant John Chard, Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead and Assistant Commissary James Dalton – decided after a short debate that given the difficulties of transporting the hospital patients, they would have to make a stand and attempt to fight off the enemy.

The Battle of Isandlwana (Charles Edwin Fripp). Image credit: Charles Edwin Fripp, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Preparing the Drift for battle

Throughout the day the defenders prepared a makeshift defensive perimeter, whilst nervously looking over their shoulders as the Zulu force marched ever nearer. They arrived at 4.30 PM. Known as the Undi Corps, these warriors had not been engaged earlier at Isandlwana and were eager to win some glory of their own.

To show the seriousness of their intent, they were commanded by King Cetshwayo’s half-brother Prince Dabulamanzi.

At this point some of the cavalry picketed around the drift began to flee, an action which disgusted the remainder so much that they fired on them, killing a Corporal. This left Bromhead with just 150 men to defend the perimeter. A new smaller wall was hastily constructed with biscuit boxes, the toughest material at the garrison’s disposal. Just minutes later, the Zulus attacked.

The Battle of Rorke’s Drift

Though rifle fire thinned out their charging ranks, there were simply too many fight in that way, so fierce hand-to-hand combat ensued when the warriors reached the walls. In this sort of fighting the British had no real advantage over their experienced foe other than their defensive wall. They fought heroically, however, and suffered just five men dead during this first assault.

Battered, the Zulus withdrew and regrouped for another attack which was not long in coming. By six PM Lieutenants Bromhead and Dalton had been forced to abandon the outer north wall after determined assault and withdraw to the field hospital.

Here, savage fighting took place as Zulus surrounded the small building like the sea lapping against a rock and tried almost anything to get inside and slaughter its inhabitants.

‘The Defence of Rorke’s Drift’ by Lady Butler (1880). Image credit: Elizabeth Thompson, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

As the native warriors slowly and inexorably took over the building, the roof of which burst into flames, its defenders risked their lives to shepherd the patients out and to the dubious safety of the stone cattle Kraal (Afrikaans word for enclosure), the last line of defence.

Some patients could not be saved and were killed in their beds during the retreat.

Relief

The defence of the Kraal continued relentlessly until the early hours of 23 January, when the garrison were exhausted beyond words and low of ammunition. They had lost 17 killed and 15 wounded, a sizeable total considering the size of the garrison. Suddenly, as the dawn broke, however, they were unexpectedly saved.

The light revealed that the Zulus had gone, and only their dead and wounded remained. Against all the odds, the garrison had survived.

The enemy had left hundreds dead behind, and after the massacre at Isandlwana and the killing of the British patients earlier, the garrison and the relief force that arrived that day were not in a merciful mood towards their wounded.

The defiant defence of Rorke’s Drift left a lasting impression at home, and was responsible for 11 Victoria Crosses. Some modern critics have contended that this had more to do with hiding the severity of the defeat at Isandlwana than anything particularly heroic at Rorke’s Drift.

Though there is doubtless some truth in this claim, as a tale of survival against the odds it has few competitors.