From the ashes of World War One

In the aftermath of World War One, the defeated Germans were subjected to a series of humiliating terms in the Treaty of Versailles, including the loss of much of their territory. One of the new states created by the treaty was Czechoslovakia, which contained an area inhabited by large numbers of ethnic Germans which Hitler termed the Sudetenland.

Hitler rose to power on a wave of ill-feeling generated by the treaty, which had always been considered too harsh in Britain. As a result, British governments largely turned a blind eye to Hitler’s promises to undo much of the treaty after he was elected in 1933.

By 1938, the Nazi leader had already re-militarised the Rhineland, which was meant to be a buffer zone between historic enemies Germany and France, and incorporated Austria into his new German Reich.

Hitler eyes the Sudetenland

After years of appeasement, Hitler’s aggressive stance towards his neighbours was finally beginning to cause concern in Britain and France. However, Hitler was not finished. He had his eyes set on the Sudetenland, which was rich in the natural resources necessary for war and was conveniently populated by ethnic Germans – many of whom genuinely wanted to return to German rule.

Hitler’s first move was to order the Sudeten Nazi Party to demand full autonomy for ethnic Germans from Czech leader Benes, knowing that these demands would be refused. He then circulated tales of Czech atrocities towards Sudeten Germans and emphasised their desire to once again be under German rule, in an effort to legitimise his annexation of the territory.

If his intentions weren’t already clear enough, 750,000 German troops were sent to the Czech border, officially in order to carry out manoeuvres. Unsurprisingly, these developments greatly alarmed the British, who were desperate to avoid another war.

Hitler’s Wehrmacht on the march.

Appeasement continues

With Hitler now openly demanding the Sudetenland, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew out to meet him and Sudeten Nazi leader Henlein, on 12 and 15 September. Hitler’s response to Chamberlain was that the Sudetenland was refusing the Czech Germans the right to self-determination, and that British “threats” were not appreciated.

After meeting with his cabinet, Chamberlain met with the Nazi leader once more. He stated that Britain would not oppose a German takeover of the Sudetenland. Hitler, aware that he had the upper hand, shook his head and told Chamberlain that the Sudetenland was no longer enough.

He wanted the state of Czechoslovakia to be carved up and shared between various nations. Chamberlain knew that he could not possibly agree to these terms. War loomed on the horizon.

With hours to go before Nazi troops crossed the border into Czechoslovakia, Hitler and his Italian ally Mussolini offered Chamberlain what appeared to be a lifeline: a last-minute conference in Munich, where French Prime Minister Daladier would also be in attendance. The Czechs and Stalin’s USSR were not invited.

In the early hours of 30 September the Munich Pact was signed, and the Nazis gained ownership of the Sudetenland, which changed hands on 10 October 1938. Chamberlain was initially received as a heroic peacemaker upon returning to Britain, but the consequences of the Munich Pact would merely mean that the war, when it did begin, would start on Hitler’s terms.

Chamberlain receiving a warm reception upon returning home.

War on the horizon

The loss of the Sudetenland crippled Czechoslovakia as a fighting force, with most of their armaments, fortifications and raw materials signed off to Germany without them having any say in the matter.

Unable to resist without French and British support, by the end of 1938 the whole of the country was in Nazi hands. Even more importantly, the pointed exclusion of the USSR at the meeting convinced Stalin that an anti-Nazi alliance with the western powers was not possible.

Instead, a year later he signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact with Hitler, leaving the road open for Hitler to invade eastern Europe knowing that he could count on Stalin’s support. From the British point of view, the only good to come out of Munich was that Chamberlain realised that he could not appease Hitler any longer. If Hitler invaded Poland, Britain and France would have to go to war.

Whilst Chamberlain’s handling of late 1930s foreign relations is ultimately what he is most remembered for, he was a staunch advocate for progressive social and domestic policy at home, and worked tirelessly in office despite crises and betrayals.

Here are 10 facts about Neville Chamberlain.

1. Initially he showed little interest in politics

Chamberlain was born in 1869 in Birmingham, to a middle class family with connections in local politics. He attended Rugby School, and later Mason College (now known as the University of Birmingham), but showed little enthusiasm for his studies.

Neville became an apprentice accountant, but after less than a year, his father dispatched him to the Bahamas to establish and run a sisal plantation. The endeavour failed, and Chamberlain returned to England six years later, having lost £50,000.

2. His wife convinced him to run as an MP

In 1910, aged 40, Chamberlain met Anne Cole, with whom he quickly, and surprisingly, fell in love. The pair married the following year and Anne greatly encouraged his entry into local politics. The two shared a lot of views and political interests – particularly regarding housing – and Anne remained a constant source of support throughout his life.

Chamberlain initially became involved with local Birmingham politics, standing as a local councillor and eventually being elected Lord Mayor of Birmingham. In 1919, he stood as the Unionist candidate for Birmingham Ladywood, and was elected to Parliament with almost 70% of the vote.

3. He clashed frequently with David Lloyd George

Before being elected as an MP, Chamberlain had been appointed Director of National Service by the then Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, co-ordinating conscription and ensuring essential industries had sufficient workforces during the war. Less than a year later, Chamberlain resigned, saying he had received little to no support from the Prime Minister.

In 1920, Chamberlain was offered a position in the Ministry of Health – he declined it, citing the fact he did not want to serve under Lloyd George. Several colleagues warned him if he were to decline the role, he may well not be offered anything else for the duration of Lloyd George’s premiership.

Lloyd George unexpectedly resigned in 1922 following a breakdown in the Conservative-Unionist coalition, and Lloyd George’s longstanding ally, Bonar Law, was temporarily appointed Prime Minister. Taking advantage of this, Chamberlain served as Minister of Health and briefly, Chancellor of the Exchequer, before the Conservatives’ defeat to Ramsey McDonald’s Labour in 1923.

Neville Chamberlain doffing his hat to crowds in Munich in 1938.

Image Credit: Bundesarchiv Bild / CC

4. His star began to rise after the 1924 General Election

Chamberlain was reappointed as Minister of Health in 1924, and passed 21 key pieces of legislation before he left office 5 years later. In 1931, he was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer: no small job given the extent of Britain’s war debt.

Major policies and achievements included the passing of ‘Imperial Preference’ import tariffs, increases in welfare spending and a somewhat controversial reduction in defence spending, which was later reversed from 1935 onwards, as the perceived threat of Hitler’s Germany rose.

Many historians and politicians later criticised Chamberlain for disarming in the first place, but in general, many assess his legacy as Chancellor relatively positively, arguing he oversaw a general rise in living standards and could not have anticipated the crisis that was to come.

5. He thought his premiership would be defined by domestic reform

Stanley Baldwin resigned as Prime Minister following the abdication crisis of 1936 and coronation of the new king, George VI: he advised the new king to send for Chamberlain in order to appoint him as the new Prime Minister.

In 1937, Chamberlain passed the Factories Act, and in 1938, the Holiday With Pay Act, Coal Act, and Housing Act, all of which aimed at improving working conditions and effectively saw more social security and legislation to create safer, better working and living conditions for many people. Other social reform and domestic policy that had been discussed was shelved following the outbreak of war in 1939.

6. The situation in Europe was out of his control

By 1937, European politics were becoming increasingly strained: Spain was already engulfed in a brutal civil war. Under Adolf Hitler, Germany was rearming – breaking the terms of the Treaty of Versailles – and Chamberlain did his best to reconcile with Germany rather than to openly condemn Hitler’s policy.

He also opened talks with Italy, who had become an international pariah following its invasion and conquest of Ethiopia, in an attempt to cement relations with Italy and woo them as a potential ally against Germany if necessary.

Ultimately, Chamberlain remembered the horrors of the First World War well, and was determined not to let Britain be dragged into another costly and damaging conflict. As a result, he famously attempted to pursue a policy of appeasement in Europe.

7. Many consider him to have made the most serious error of judgement in the 20th century

Famously, Chamberlain visited the German Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, at his retreat in Berchtesgarden, near Munich in 1938. The two spoke for about 3 hours: Hitler demanded the annexation of the Sudetenland, and Chamberlain believed he had no further designs on European expansion beyond this concession. Chamberlain agreed on the proviso that a plebicite (similar to a referendum) would be held, and if the population voted in favour of Hitler’s annexation, it would happen.

Chamberlain visited Hitler several more times in September 1938, and eventually the issue culminated in a summit attended by Britain, Germany, France and Italy, where the Sudetenland question was to be settled once and for all.

Chamberlain triumphantly clutching a document signed by Hitler promising peace on his return from Munich in September 1938.

Image Credit: Imperial War Museums / CC

On his return, on 30 September 1938, Chamberlain famously said:

“My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British prime minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time.”

At the time, some suggested Chamberlain should be awarded a Nobel Peace Prize, whilst others lauded his skill as a statesman and ability to avoid war. It did not take long for Chamberlain’s reputation to be torn to shreds – war was soon to follow and many consider his concessions to Hitler in 1938 as misguided as they provided Germany enough time to consolidate her forces.

8. He took Britain to war in September 1939

Kristallnacht, in November 1938, firmly turned public opinion against Germany: any dialogue or friendliness with Germany would have been deemed unacceptable by the public following a violent pogrom against Germany’s Jewish population. Germany continued to rearm and expand, invading Bohemia and Moravia in early 1939.

Chamberlain began to increasingly focus on rearmament in Britain, building up the Territorial Army, introducing peacetime conscription, and creating a Ministry of Supply – these policies were both to placate the British and intimidate Germany.

On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland and Britain issued an ultimatum for them to withdraw or face war. They refused. On 3 September 1939, Chamberlain declared Britain was at war with Germany, called Parliament to sit on a Sunday and created a War Cabinet – all measures designed to facilitate a speedy crushing of Germany.

Despite everything, Chamberlain’s popularity remained high – in April 1940, it was still at 60%.

9. He quickly came under attack from his own government

Debates over Norway brought matters to a head for Chamberlain’s government. Germany had invaded, and the few Allied forces that were deployed there were no match for the German army – they were ordered to withdraw.

The whole operation, known as the ‘Norway Debate’, received immense criticism. Debates in Parliament worsened the situation, as many felt Chamberlain was asking for party political voting lines on the issue rather than pulling together for unity in a time of national crisis.

After discussions with Attlee’s Labour party about Labour effectively joining Chamberlain’s government in order to create a coherent, unified government, it became clear that Labour would not serve under Chamberlain, but saw Winston Churchill as a valid alternative.

On 10 May 1940, Chamberlain formally resigned, asking the king to send for Churchill as his replacement. Churchill and Baldwin both wrote to express their gratitude to Chamberlain for his decision.

10. He died shortly afterwards

Initially Chamberlain continued to serve as an MP and was appointed Lord President of the Council: Churchill decided not to dramatically shake up the Cabinet given the situation. Colleagues remember him continuing to work diligently and hard, showing no bitterness  However, Chamberlain had no chance to repair or fully understand his legacy: he resigned in September 1940 once it became clear he was seriously ill, with limited time remaining, and he died two months later, in November 1940, from bowel cancer.

Just before his death, Chamberlain wrote he did “not fear the historian’s verdict”, believing that his actions at Munich were the best possible course of action to give Britain a fighting chance at winning the coming war. This seems somewhat fortunate, given many historians would condemn his decision to appease Hitler – and fascism across Europe – for as long as he did.

Outspoken opposition to self-government for India and support for King Edward VIII in the 1936 Abdication Crisis distanced Churchill from Parliament’s majority.

His sharp and unrelenting focus on the growing Nazi German threat was considered militaristic ‘scaremongering’ and dangerous throughout much of the decade. But that preoccupation with the unpopular policy of rearmament would eventually bring Churchill back to power in 1940 and helped secure his place at history’s top table.

Political Estrangement of the 1930s

By the time of the Conservative election defeat of 1929, Churchill had served in Parliament for nearly 30 years. He had switched party allegiances twice, had been Chancellor of the Exchequer and First Lord of the Admiralty, and had held ministerial posts in both parties ranging from Home Secretary to Colonial Secretary.

But Churchill became estranged with Conservative leadership over issues of protective tariffs and Indian Home Rule, which he bitterly opposed. Ramsay McDonald did not invite Churchill to join the Cabinet of his National Government formed in 1931.

Churchill’s major political focus throughout the first half of the 1930s became outspoken opposition against any concessions which might weaken Britain’s hold on India. He forecast widespread British unemployment and civil strife in India and frequently made scathing comments about Gandhi the “fakhir”.

Churchill’s intemperate outbursts, at a time when public opinion was coming round to the idea of Dominion status for India, made him seem an out of touch ‘Colonial Blimp’ figure.

Churchill encountered difficulties with the government of Stanley Baldwin (pictured), in particular over the idea of Indian independence. He once bitterly remarked of Baldwin that “it would be better had he never lived”.

He was further distanced from fellow MPs by his outlying support of Edward VIII throughout the Abdication Crisis. His address to the House of Commons on 7 December 1936 to plead for delay and prevent pressuring the King into a hasty decision was shouted down.

Churchill’s companions earnt him little respect; one of his most devoted followers, Irish MP Brendan Bracken was widely disliked and regarded as a phoney. Churchill’s reputation in Parliament and with the wider public could have hardly sunk lower.

A stand against appeasement

During this low point in his career, Churchill concentrated on writing; in his exile years at Chartwell he produced 11 volumes of history and memoir and more than 400 articles for the world’s newspapers.  History mattered deeply to Churchill; it provided him with his own identity and justification as well as an invaluable perspective on the present.

His biography of the First Duke of Marlborough was concerned not only with the past but with Churchill’s own time and himself. It was both ancestral veneration and a comment on contemporary politics with close parallels to his own stand against appeasement.

Churchill repeatedly urged that it was folly for the victors of World War One to either disarm or to allow Germany to rearm while German grievances had not been resolved. As early as 1930 Churchill, attending a dinner party at the German Embassy in London, expressed concerned about the latent dangers of a rabble-rouser named Adolf Hitler.

In 1934, with Nazis in power in a resurgent Germany, Churchill told Parliament “there is not an hour to lose” in preparing to build up British armaments. He passionately lamented in 1935 that whilst

“Germany [was] arming at breakneck speed, England [was] lost in a pacifist dream, France corrupt and torn by dissension, America remote and indifferent.”

Only a few allied stood with Churchill as he duelled in the House of Commons with the successive governments of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain.

Churchill and Neville Chamberlain, the chief proponent of appeasement, 1935.

In 1935 he was one of the founding members of ‘Focus’ a group which brought together people of differing political backgrounds, such as Sir Archibald Sinclair and Lady Violet Bonham Carter, to unite in seeking ‘the defence of freedom and peace’. A much wider Arms and Covenant Movement was formed in 1936.

By 1938, Hitler had fortified his army, built the Luftwaffe, militarised the Rhineland and threatened Czechoslovakia. Churchill made an urgent appeal to the House

“Now is the time at last to rouse the nation.”

He would later admit in The Gathering Storm to occasionally exaggerating statistics, such as his prediction in September 1935 that Germany might have 3,000 first-line aircraft by October 1937, to create alarm and provoke action:

‘In these endeavours no doubt I painted the picture even darker than it was.’

His ultimate conviction remained that appeasement and negotiation was doomed to fail and that postponing war rather than exhibiting strength would lead to greater bloodshed.

A voice on the periphery

The political and public majority considered Churchill’s position irresponsible and extreme and his warnings wildly paranoid.

After the horrors of the Great War, very few could imagine embarking on another. It was widely believed that negotiation would be effective in controlling Hitler and that Germany’s restlessness was understandable in the context of the harsh penalties imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.

Members of the Conservative establishment such as John Reith, first director-general of the BBC, and Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times throughout 1930s, supported Chamberlain’s appeasement policy.

The Daily Express referred to Churchill’s speech in October 1938 against the Munich agreement as

“an alarmist oration by a man whose mind is soaked in the conquests of Marlborough”.

John Maynard Keynes, writing in the New Statesman, was urging the Czechs to negotiate with Hitler in 1938. Many newspapers omitted Churchill’s foreboding speech and favoured coverage of Chamberlain’s remark that the situation in Europe had greatly relaxed.

Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini, and Ciano pictured just before signing the Munich Agreement, 29 September 1938 (Credit: Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-R69173 / CC-BY-SA 3.0).

Onset of war vindicates Churchill’s foreboding

Churchill had contested the Munich Agreement 1938, in which Prime Minister Chamberlain ceded a part of Czechoslovakia in exchange for peace, on the grounds that it amounted to ‘throwing a small state to the wolves’.

A year later, Hitler had broken the promise and invaded Poland. Britain and France declared war and Churchill’s lurid warnings about Hitler’s intentions were vindicated by unfolding events.

His whistle-blowing about the pace of German air rearmament had helped galvanise the government into belated action over air defence.

Churchill was finally readmitted to the Cabinet in 1939 as First Lord of the Admiralty. In May 1940, he became Prime Minister of a National Government with Britain already at war and facing its darkest hours.

His challenge thereafter was not to instill fear but to keep it under control. On 18 June 1940, Churchill said that if England could defeat Hitler:

“all Europe may be free, and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands; but if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, and all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new dark age.”

Churchill’s independent stance against appeasement, his unwavering attention and later, his wartime leadership, granted him stature and longevity far beyond that which could have been imagined in the early 1930s.

He actually comes back and, even though he regrets the exuberance of peace for our time, he nevertheless refuses to accelerate British rearmament. Halifax and other cabinet ministers say, “You were very lucky this time. We must increase British rearmament,” but Chamberlain says, “But I brought back peace.”

This article is an edited transcript of Appeasing Hitler with Tim Bouverie on Dan Snow’s History Hit, first broadcast 7 July 2019.

So it was not an argument used by contemporaries, even if members of the Armed Forces were very much aware of the pitiful state that Britain’s arms were in.

Out-armed

It’s true, we did not have the Spitfire, we did not have the Hurricane. Even though they were being ordered, they weren’t ready yet. We didn’t have radar – all these things which made the difference between victory and defeat in the Battle of Britain.

But the breathing space was also used by the Germans. It’s not a zero sum game. They had the same opportunities, and if you look at the figures, it’s fairly clear that the Germans out-armed Britain and France, certainly on land and even in the air, as well as getting this huge trove of munitions (from the Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia).

So the breathing space argument I don’t think really holds, and not least because the diplomatic situation had become so much worse.

A significant number of Czech tanks, made at the Skoda Works, partook in the German invasion of France in 1940. Image Credit: Bundesarchiv / Commons.

The Soviets make their move

The Soviet Union who, as we know, in retrospect and as some contemporaries were saying, ultimately defeated the German army in the Second World War. and without them we would have been stuffed.

The Soviet Foreign Minister was constantly urging some form of anti-Nazi alliance with the West and was rebuffed, whereas by September 1939, Stalin has made an alliance with Hitler. We’re in a diplomatically and strategically worse position in September 1939 than we were a year earlier.

This article is an edited transcript of Appeasing Hitler with Tim Bouverie on Dan Snow’s History Hit, first broadcast 7 July 2019. You can listen to the full episode below or to the full podcast for free on Acast.

In March 1939 Hitler invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia, annexed it and rendered all of Chamberlain’s claims for peace with honour and peace for our time null and void.

Chamberlain initially didn’t even appreciate the magnitude of what had happened. He thought that Czechoslovakia had sort of fallen apart internally. There were lots of domestic rows going on between the different minorities in Czechoslovakia which had preceded the German invasion.

Ethnic Germans in Saaz, Sudetenland, greet German soldiers with the Nazi salute, 1938. Image Credit: Bundesarchiv / Commons.

Desperate scramble

The British were certainly not spoiling for a fight, but they were then carried along by a wave of panics.

The Romanian minister came and visited Chamberlain and said that the Germans were about to invade Romania. There were rumours that the Germans were about to invade Switzerland, that they were about to bomb London, that they might invade Poland, and there was a huge desperate scramble to, at the last moment, weld together an anti-Nazi alliance.

It was hoped that this would centre on the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union wasn’t prepared to play ball, and Chamberlain and his colleagues had cold shouldered Stalin for most of the decade. And so they rested on Poland.

They wanted a two-front war. If they had to fight Germany, they wanted a two-front war from the beginning, and they thought that Poland was the most substantial military power in the East. So they guaranteed Poland, then they guaranteed Romania, they guaranteed Greece, there was an agreement with Turkey.

Suddenly there were deterrents and alliances going out left, right, and centre. But they were definitely not longing for war.

Why did Hitler keep pushing?

Hitler kept pushing because he didn’t believe that the British and French would actually fight. One of the biggest problems with the Munich Agreement was he thought that they would continually give in.

It was not clear whether he would have curtailed his plans had he been convinced that the British and French would fight for Poland, but he was determined to see the Greater German Reich in his lifetime, and he didn’t think he was going to live much longer.

He also saw that the British and French were belatedly closing the arms gap which he had opened up. This was the moment.

So it was boldness on Hitler’s part, determination to see his program through, but also an unwillingness to believe the British and the French when they said that they were going to fight for Poland.

Ribbentrop’s role

Joachim von Ribbentrop.

Hitler was continually assured by his completely egregious Joachim von Ribbentrop, his foreign minister and one-time ambassador to London. Ribbentrop, the most bitter Anglophobe you could imagine, continually assured Hitler that Britain would not fight. He said that again and again and again.

There was a war party within the Nazi hierarchy and there was a peace party. Ribbentrop led the war party and the war party, which Hitler was obviously part of and the leading member of, won.

When Britain declared war and Britain’s ambassador Neville Henderson handed a note to the German Foreign Ministry, and then von Ribbentrop delivered this to Hitler, Hitler apparently, according to his interpreter, turned to von Ribbentrop and said, “What next?” in a very angry way.

Hitler was making it clear, so the interpreter thought, that he was surprised that the British had declared war and was angry with Ribbentrop.

This article is an edited transcript of Appeasing Hitler with Tim Bouverie on Dan Snow’s History Hit, first broadcast 7 July 2019. You can listen to the full episode below or to the full podcast for free on Acast.

Everyone realised once Austria had been taken over, that Czechoslovakia was going to be the next item that Hitler wished to consume. And the reasons for this were fairly obvious.

The soft underbelly

All the fortifications defending Czechoslovakia were on the west, and by the absorption of Austria, Hitler had turned the Czech’s defences. He could now attack them from the south where they were very poorly defended.

There was also this minority, these 3,250,000 ethnic Germans who had never been part of modern day Germany – they were never part of Bismarck’s Reich. They were part of the Habsburg Empire, and they had been riled up by a sort of faux Nazi party to demand inclusion into the Reich.

Hitler wanted to include these people because he was the ultimate pan-German nationalist and he wanted to include all Germans within the Reich. But he also wanted to take over the whole of Czechoslovakia.

It was a very rich country, it had the world’s largest munitions site at Skoda, and if your aim is ultimately to conquer living space, ‘Lebensraum’, in Eastern Europe and Russia, then Czechoslovakia had to be dealt with first. So it was both a strategic and ideological obvious next step.

Czechoslovakia was the home of the world’s largest munitions centre at Skoda. Image Credit: Bundesarchiv / Commons.

Trusting Hitler’s word

Chamberlain and Halifax continued to believe that a peaceful solution could be found. Hitler was very careful at every stage of whatever he was demanding. From the Rhineland, to a larger army, to Czechoslovakia or Poland, he always made it seem like his demand was very reasonable.

His language and the way he delivered it in rants and raves and threats of war was unreasonable, but he always said it was only a specific thing; and each time he always said that this was his last demand.

The fact that nobody had realised that he’d continually broken his word by 1938 is fairly shocking, or the fact that Chamberlain and Halifax hadn’t woken up to the fact that this was a serial liar is pretty shocking.

They thought that a solution could be found and that there was a way of incorporating the Sudeten Germans into Germany peacefully, which ultimately happened. But they had not realised what others had realised: that Hitler wasn’t going to stop there.

What did Chamberlain and Halifax propose?

Chamberlain and Halifax didn’t agree that Hitler should be allowed to take the Sudetenland. They thought that there could be some form of plebiscite.

In those days referendums were extremely popular devices for demagogues to get unpopular measures through.

They also thought that there could be some sort of accommodation. Hitler, until almost the middle of the Czech crisis in September 1938, was not demanding their absorption into the Reich. He was saying that they must have self-government, that there must be full equality for the Sudetens within the Czech state.

In fact, the Sudetan Germans already had that. Even though they were not the majority population and felt slightly humiliated having been in the ascendancy when the Austro-Hungarian Empire existed, they enjoyed civil and religious liberties such as could only be dreamt of in Nazi Germany. So it was an incredibly hypocritical claim.

A 1938 terrorist action of Sudeten German Voluntary Force.

The crisis escalates

As the crisis developed and more and more intelligence of German forces building up along the Czech border flooded into the Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay, it became clear that Hitler was not going to just wait and allow some form of self-government for the Sudetens. He actually wanted to annex the territory.

At the height of the crisis The Times newspaper said that this should be allowed to happen: if that was what was going to stop war, then the Sudetens should just join with Germany. This was a really shocking thing.

Back then The Times were so closely linked to the British government that it was viewed across the world as a declaration of government policy.

Cables were going across almost every single foreign capital saying, “Well, the British have changed their mind. The British have prepared to accept annexation.” Privately Lord Halifax, who was best friends with The Times’ Sir Geoffrey Dawson had agreed to this, but it was still not official British policy.

Featured image credit: Ethnic Germans in Saaz, Sudetenland, greet German soldiers with the Nazi salute, 1938. Bundesarchiv / Commons.

This article is an edited transcript of Appeasing Hitler with Tim Bouverie on Dan Snow’s History Hit, first broadcast 7 July 2019. You can listen to the full episode below or to the full podcast for free on Acast.

In 1937 not much within the main European continent occurred, although there was a Spanish Civil War going on which created huge angst in Britain and France. The next major test was the Anschluss with Austria,  which occurred in March 1938.

It was not so much a test once it happened, because once it was going on, there was pretty much nothing that the British and French could do. The Austrians seemed to welcome the Germans. But as a point of view of deterrence, the British really gave Hitler the green light.

Undermining British foreign policy

Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax completely undermined the official foreign policy of Great Britain as set out by the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and by the Foreign Office. This was that Austrian integrity must be respected, as must Czechoslovak integrity.

Instead, Halifax visited Hitler at Berchtesgaden in November 1937 and said that the British had no problem with him incorporating Austrians or Czechoslovaks into the Reich, providing it was done peacefully.

These were not strategic British interests, there was nothing that we could have done to stop a German invasion anyway. So as long as Hitler did it peacefully, we didn’t really have a problem with it. And unsurprisingly, Hitler viewed this as a sign of weakness that the British wouldn’t become involved.

Lord Halifax.

Why did Halifax and Chamberlain do this?

I think a lot of people would say, as the saying went at the time, “Better Hitler than Stalin at the Channel ports.” I don’t think that was quite as important for Chamberlain and Halifax. I think both were not very military men.

Neither of them had seen front-line action in the First World War. Chamberlain hadn’t fought at all. He’d been too old. But fundamentally they disagreed with the analysis of Churchill and Vansittart that Hitler was a man intent upon European hegemony.

They thought that his intentions were limited and that if only they could get to some sort of readjustment of the European status quo, then there was no reason to have another war. And on the face of it, the issues of Austria or Czechoslovakia were not issues on which Britain would normally think of going to war.

These were not, “We were a maritime and imperial power.” Eastern Europe, Central Europe, those were not British concerns.

Opposing European hegemony

What Churchill and others pointed out was that it was not about the rights or wrongs of 3 million Sudeten Germans being incorporated into the Reich or the Anschluss. It was about one power dominating the continent.

British foreign policy as they saw it, being better versed in history, had always been to oppose one power dominating the continent. It was why we opposed Louis XIV in the 17th century, why we opposed Napoleon in the 18th and 19th centuries, why we opposed the Kaiser Reich in the 20th century and why we eventually opposed the Third Reich. It wasn’t over the rights or wrongs of self-determination for some fringe population.

Featured image credit: German soldiers enter Austria. Bundesarchiv / Commons.

This article is an edited transcript of Appeasing Hitler with Tim Bouverie on Dan Snow’s History Hit, first broadcast 7 July 2019. You can listen to the full episode below or to the full podcast for free on Acast.

The most famous and iconic moments of the appeasement story were Chamberlain’s three flying visits to Hitler.

The first meeting

The first one, where Hitler and Chamberlain met in Berchtesgaden, was where Chamberlain agreed that the Sudetens should be allowed to join with the Reich should they wish to. He suggested that there should be either a plebiscite or a referendum.

He then returned to Britain and persuaded the French to abandon the Czechs, their former allies. He persuaded them that they must give in, that they must cede the Sudetenland to Hitler. And the French do this.

The French pretended to be highly affronted to be asked to abandon their ally, but privately they had already decided that they couldn’t fight for them anyway. They just wanted to pin the blame on the British.

Chamberlain (centre, hat and umbrella in hands) walks with German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop (right) as the Prime Minister leaves for home after the Berchtesgaden meeting, 16 September 1938. On the left is Alexander von Dörnberg.

The second meeting

Chamberlain, very pleased with himself, returned to Germany a week later, and this time he met Hitler on the banks of the Rhine at Bad Godesberg. This is around 24 September 1938.

And he said, “Isn’t it marvellous? I’ve got you exactly what you want. The French have agreed to abandon the Czechs, and both the British and the French have told the Czechs that if you don’t surrender this territory, then we will abandon you and you will have your most assured destruction.”

And Hitler, because he wanted a little war and wanted to keep upping the ante, said,

“That’s great, but I’m afraid it’s not good enough. It’s got to happen much faster than you’re saying, and we have to consider other minorities, like the Polish minority and the Hungarian minority.”

At that point, Chamberlain was still prepared to give in to Hitler’s demands even though it was very clear Hitler had no interest in a peaceful solution. But the British Cabinet, led by Halifax most interestingly, started to resist continued appeasement.

Chamberlain (left) and Hitler leave the Bad Godesberg meeting, 23 September 1938.

At this point, the British Cabinet revolted and rejected Hitler’s terms. For one brief week, it looked as if Britain was going to go to war over Czechoslovakia.

People dug trenches in Hyde Park, they tried on gas masks, the Territorial Army was called up, the Royal Navy was being mobilized.

At the absolute last moment, when Chamberlain was in the midst of a speech in the House of Commons talking about preparations for war, the telephone in the Foreign Office rang. It was Hitler.

Not in person. It was the British ambassador in Germany saying that Hitler was inviting the great powers (Britain, France, Italy, and Germany) for a conference at Munich to find a peaceful solution.

Munich: the third meeting

That lead to the Munich Agreement, which is actually far less exciting than the previous summits. By the time the British and French prime ministers boarded their airplanes, it’s a done deal. The Sudetenland was going to be surrendered, and it’s a face-saving exercise.

Hitler’s decided against war; they’ve decided to give in. It’s just an agreement.

Adolf Hitler signs the Munich Agreement. Image Credit: Bundesarchiv / Commons.

But Hitler did not stop there. It’s important also to realise that dissatisfaction with the Munich Agreement began a long time before he invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia.

There was huge euphoria after the Munich Agreement, but that was relief. Within a couple of weeks, most people in Britain were beginning to realise that the only way that war was to be avoided was by giving into this bully’s demands and that they’re probably not going to be his last demands.

Tearing up the agreement

Then there was the enormous shock in 1938 with Kristallnacht and the huge wave of anti-Jewish violence that spreads across Germany. And then in March 1939, Hitler teared up the Munich Agreement and annexed the whole of Czechoslovakia, which humiliated Chamberlain.

In doing so Hitler rendered all of Chamberlain’s claims for peace with honour and peace for our time null and void.

Hitler’s rejection and violation of the Munich Agreement in March 1939 is the decisive moment of the appeasement policy. This is when Hitler, beyond any doubt, proves that he is an untrustworthy man who is not merely seeking to incorporate Germans into his Reich, but is after territorial aggrandisement on a Napoleonic scale.

This was something which Churchill and others had been claiming. And the tearing up of the Munich Agreement is, I think, the watershed moment.

He did so reluctantly, as is evident by this broadcast, and in the knowledge that he was committing Britain to a long and bloody struggle.

This is one of the many key dates of World War Two, and brought Britain together with France into the struggle on Germany’s Western Front that would last until the end of the war. However, initially the British and French did little to come to Poland’s assistance, instead opting for a defensive strategy that was labelled ‘The Phony War‘ with no major military operations.

Yet the defensive warfare of World War One was no longer valid, and the German offensive ‘Blitzkrieg’ strategy led to them and the Axis powers occupying most of mainland Europe by the end of 1940.

Full text version:

This morning the British Ambassador in Berlin handed the German Government a final Note stating that, unless we heard from them by 11 o’clock that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Poland, a state of war would exist between us.

I have to tell you now that no such undertaking has been received, and that consequently this country is at war with Germany.

You can imagine what a bitter blow it is to me that all my long struggle to win peace has failed. Yet I cannot believe that there is anything more or anything different that I could have done and that would have been more successful.

Up to the very last it would have been quite possible to have arranged a peaceful and honourable settlement between Germany and Poland, but Hitler would not have it. He had evidently made up his mind to attack Poland whatever happened, and although He now says he put forward reasonable proposals which were rejected by the Poles, that is not a true statement. The proposals were never shown to the Poles, nor to us, and, although they were announced in a German broadcast on Thursday night, Hitler did not wait to hear comments on them, but ordered his troops to cross the Polish frontier. His action shows convincingly that there is no chance of expecting that this man will ever give up his practice of using force to gain his will. He can only be stopped by force.

We and France are today, in fulfilment of our obligations, going to the aid of Poland, who is so bravely resisting this wicked and unprovoked attack on her people. We have a clear conscience. We have done all that any country could do to establish peace. The situation in which no word given by Germany’s ruler could be trusted and no people or country could feel themselves safe has become intolerable. And now that we have resolved to finish it, I know that you will all play your part with calmness and courage.

At such a moment as this the assurances of support that we have received from the Empire are a source of profound encouragement to us.

The Government have made plans under which it will be possible to carry on the work of the nation in the days of stress and strain that may be ahead. But these plans need your help. You may be taking your part in the fighting services or as a volunteer in one of the branches of Civil Defence. If so you will report for duty in accordance with the instructions you have received. You may be engaged in work essential to the prosecution of war for the maintenance of the life of the people – in factories, in transport, in public utility concerns, or in the supply of other necessaries of life. If so, it is of vital importance that you should carry on with your jobs.

Now may God bless you all. May he defend the right. It is the evil things that we shall be fighting against – brute force, bad faith, injustice, oppression and persecution – and against them I am certain that the right will prevail.

The most famous instance of the policy in action is during the build-up to World War Two when the major European powers failed to confront German expansionism in Europe, Italian aggression in Africa and Japanese policy in China.

It was a policy motivated by several factors, and one that tarred the reputations of several politicians, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain notable among them.

Aggressive foreign policy

Against the backdrop of forcible seizure of political control at home, from 1935 on-wards Hitler began an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy. This was a key element of his domestic appeal as an assertive leader who was unashamed of German success.

As Germany grew in strength, she began to swallow German speaking lands around her. Meanwhile in 1936 the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded and established Italian control of Abyssinia .

Chamberlain continued to follow his appeasement until 1938. It was only when Hitler reneged on the promise he had given to the British Prime Minister at the Munich Conference – that he would not occupy the rest of Czechoslovakia – that Chamberlain concluded his policy had failed and that the ambitions of dictators such as Hitler and Mussolini could not be quelled.

From left to right: Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini, and Ciano pictured before signing the Munich Agreement, which gave the Sudetenland to Germany. Credit: Bundesarchiv / Commons.

Hitler’s subsequent invasion of Poland at the start of September 1939 led to another European war. In the Far East, Japanese military expansion was largely unopposed until Pearl Harbour in 1941.

Why did the Western Powers appease for so long?

There were several factors behind this policy. The legacy of the Great War (as it came to be known at the time) had generated a great reluctance among the public for any form of European conflict, and this manifested in France and Britain not being prepared for war in the 1930s. France had suffered 1.3 million military deaths in the Great War, and Britain close to 800,000.

Since August 1919, Britain had also followed a policy of the ’10 Year Rule’ whereby it was assumed that the British Empire would not “be engaged in any great war during the next ten years.” Thus defence spending was dramatically cut during the 1920s, and by the early 1930s the equipment of the armed forces was out of date. This was compounded by the effects of the Great Depression (1929-33).

Even though the 10 Year Rule was abandoned in 1932, the decision was countered by the British Cabinet: “this must not be taken to justify an expanding expenditure by the Defence Services without regard to the very serious financial and economic situation.”

Many also felt that Germany was acting on legitimate grievances. The Treaty of Versailles had imposed debilitating restrictions on Germany and many held the view that Germany should be allowed to regain some prestige. Indeed some prominent politicians had predicted that the Treaty of Versailles would precipitate another European war:

I cannot imagine any greater cause for future war that that the German people…should be surrounded by a number of small states…each containing large masses of Germans clamoring for reunion’ – David Lloyd George, March 1919

“This is not a peace. It is an armistice for twenty years”. – Ferdinand Foch 1919

Finally an overriding fear of Communism bolstered the idea that Mussolini and Hitler were strong, patriotic leaders who would act as bulwarks to the spread of a dangerous ideology from the East.